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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of geographical deregulation on commercial
bank performance across states. We reach some general conclusions. First, the
process of deregulation on an intrastate and interstate basis generally improves
bank profitability and performance. Second, the macroeconomic variables – the
unemployment rate and real personal income per capita – and the average interest
rate affect bank performance as much, or more, than the process of deregulation.
Finally, while deregulation toward full interstate banking and branching may produce more efficient banks and a healthier banking system, we find mixed results
on this issue.
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Geographic Deregulation and Commercial Bank Performance
in US State Banking Markets
1.

Introduction

This paper examines the effects of geographical deregulation of banking and branching activity on
commercial bank performance across states. The lifting of geographic restrictions on bank
operations led to the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
(IBBEA) of 1994, allowing nationwide branching in the United States and facilitating bank
consolidation. The long process of geographic deregulation that culminated in the passage of the
IBBEA overturned the prohibitions of interstate banking of the 1927 McFadden Act and 1956
Douglas Amendment. The emergence of interstate banking and branching generated a significant
increase in mergers and acquisitions. Conventional wisdom suggests that these mergers and
acquisitions would improve bank performance and increase bank efficiency.1
Market pressures led banks to seek ways around geographic restrictions on bank operations
prior to passage of IBBEA. For example, technological innovations such as the automated teller
machine loosened regulatory constraints. In addition, two types of deregulation occurred at the
state level prior to IBBEA. First, multibank holding companies (MBHCs) received permission to
own separate banks within some states (e.g., Texas), whereas bank branching faced different
regulatory obligations. Thus, a network of banks within a MBHC achieved something similar to a
branch network, although the state restricted branch banking. Second, some states allowed MBHCs
from other states to operate within their borders with reciprocity. Reciprocity arrangements at
times covered a regional group of states and at other times the whole nation. Other states did not
require reciprocity at all.
1

For example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1997) show that bank loan losses and operating costs fell sharply when states
allowed interstate branching between 1978 and 1992. But these state-enacted deregulations could not exploit
economies of scale and scope to the full extents allowed by IBBEA.
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State restrictions on bank branch location, partly intended to prevent freewheeling banks
from choosing inaccessible sites to deter customers from redeeming their circulating banknotes
(Kane 1996, p.142), began in the nineteenth century. The McFadden Act of 1927 and the later
Douglas Amendment of 1956 effectively prohibited banks from branching across state lines and
forced all national banks to conform to the branching regulation in the state of their location, thus,
placing national banks and state banks on equal footing. The large number of commercial banks in
the United States reflects these restrictions on bank branching. Moreover, the Great Depression
and financial panic left the American public with a hostile attitude toward large banks. The U.S.
government enacted heavy regulation on the financial industry. In 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act
prohibited commercial banks from dealing in corporate securities and prohibited investment banks
from engaging in commercial banking activities. To rebuild financial credibility, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established in 1934, providing federal insurance on
bank deposits and FDIC oversight of insured institutions.
In recent decades, the U.S. commercial banking industry has experienced a dramatic
regulatory change. With the passage in 1994 of the Riegle-Neal IBBEA, bank holding companies
could acquire banks in any state after September 30, 1995. The laws of some states that allowed
interstate banking only on a regional or reciprocal basis became irrelevant. With the possibilities of
economies of scale and scope, banking analysts anticipated that mergers and acquisitions within
the banking industry would increase substantially and the number of commercial banks would
decline.
In this paper, we test whether Riegle-Neal and the process of deregulation that proceeded
its passage allowed banks to achieve greater efficiency and profitability. We examine the
profitability of the U.S. commercial banking industry before and after Riegle-Neal on a state-by-
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state basis. As noted above, many states already allowed interstate banking on regional or national,
reciprocal or non-reciprocal bases before the passage of IBBEA. The IBBEA, thus, culminated a
process of deregulation in the U.S. banking industry. We examine the effects of deregulation on a
state-by-state basis, controlling for the effect of state economic conditions and interest rate
variation on bank performance and profitability. We use Call Report data, posted on the website of
the Federal Reserve of Chicago as the Report of Condition of Income.2 The rest of the paper is
organized follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 describes the data and
methodology. Section 4 reports the mean values for the performance measures in the pre- and postIBBEA periods and discusses differences. Section 5 presents and discusses regression results.
Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature Review
During the past thirty years, competition in banking and attempts to expand market reach by large
institutions exerted much pressure for deregulation. The enactment of Riegle-Neal IBBEA in 1994
encouraged structural changes in the banking industry through bank mergers and acquisitions. This
section surveys a selection of the academic research on pre- and post-IBBEA structure and
performance of the banking industry.
The 1980s and early 1990s saw severe financial turbulence – the savings and loan debacle
followed by the crisis in the commercial banking industry. These crises led to failure rates among
financial institutions not seen since the Great Depression and triggered many of the regulatory
changes that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.3 Conventional wisdom suggests that the lifting of
restrictions on interstate banking and branching in these years generated a significant increase in

2

The data, posted at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, appear under Economic Research & Data at the following
address: http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/commercial_bank_data.cfm.
3

Jeon and Miller (2007a) evaluate the causes of those failure rates, as well as merger and new-charter rates, during this
turbulent period.
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mergers and acquisitions (Rhoades 2000, and Jeon and Miller 2003). One view of the
consolidation process is that it, by and large, produced positive effects -- banks became more
efficient (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997, 1998). Another view sees a possible negative effect of
consolidation on the availability of loans to small businesses (Ely and Robinson, 2001).
Table 1 reports the steady decline in number of banks from 1976 to 2007. In 2007, fortyseven percent of banks held total assets less than 100 million dollars, another forty-seven percent
held assets between 100 million dollars and 1 billion dollars, five percent held assets between 1
billion dollars and 10 billion dollars and one percent held assets of more than 10 billion dollars. In
addition, the ten biggest banks in terms of assets owned approximately fifty percent of all
commercial bank assets.
One strand of the literature on the changing structure of the banking industry focuses on the
effects of bank mergers on bank performance. Berger (1995) tests the market-power and efficientstructure hypotheses in the banking industry. The market-power hypothesis argues that mergers
reflect a desire to set prices that are less favorable to consumers. The efficient-structure hypothesis
argues that mergers reflect efficiency considerations that lower prices, making consumers better
off. Berger (1995) concludes that the data do not support the scale-efficiency version of the
efficient-structure hypothesis. Scale does not positively relate to either profits or market
concentration. The data also do not support the traditional structure-conduct-performance
hypothesis version of the market power hypothesis. Controlling for other effects, concentration
usually relates negatively, not positively, to profitability. The profit-concentration relationship is
spurious, tracing to correlations with other variables, particularly market share.
Like Berger (1995), Jeon and Miller (2007b) examine market-power versus efficientstructure explanations of the positive correlation between bank consolidation and performance.
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Defining the “relevant” market at the state level, rather than at the MSA and non-MSA county
levels, as is common in the literature, they test whether consolidation in the banking industry
improves profitability and performance by lowering costs or increasing market power. They
perform two different tests of this issue. First, they consider the relationship between several
measures of bank concentration and one measure of bank efficiency at the state level and the
performance of the average bank within that state. They find a robust and significant positive
correlation between bank concentration in a state and the return on equity of the average bank in
that state and a significant negative correlation between bank efficiency in a state and the return on
equity of the average bank in that state. This last effect proves significant, however, only when
they exclude the unemployment rate. Second, they perform Granger temporal causality tests
between bank performance and market power, finding that market power temporally leads bank
performance. This finding supports the market power over the efficient structure hypotheses of
improved bank performance. Based on their two different tests, they conclude that the marketpower rather than the efficient-structure theory receives more support.
Berger and Mester (2003) and Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) report evidence on this
issue as well. They argue that rising profitability during the 1990s primarily reflects higher revenue,
since costs also rise. Moreover, they attribute this rising profitability to merger activity. They
contend that the initial providers of better service provision capture short-run profits, which the
industry competes away in the long run. A continual process of innovation sustained the rising
profitability during the 1990s. They dismiss the market-power explanation of rising profitability,
however, since concentration at the MSA and non-MSA level remained unchanged during the
1990s. Stiroh and Strahan (2003) argue that lifting of geographic restrictions on banking shifted
banking assets away from low- profit to high-profit banks, increasing the average profitability of
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the banking industry. In other words, the competitive dynamics of the industry reshuffled the
banking business toward more profitable banks.
Pilloff and Rhoades (2002) also study structure and profitability in banking markets. They
use the structure-conduct-performance model and regression analysis to investigate a number of
analytical issues that arise in evaluating competition and bank mergers. Their most consistent and
strongest finding shows that the local market Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration (HHI)
positively and significantly relates to profitability in the banking industry, as it generally does in
other industries. They also find that the number of organizations and the level of recent deposit
growth may provide additional information on the level of competition. Finally, several variables
including market size, the number of large banking firms, deposits per office, and resident
migration rates exhibit similar relationships to profitability in bivariate analyses, suggesting
additional characteristics which may prove important for competition.
Jayaratne and Strahan (1997, 1998) in companion studies consider various aspects of
banking industry structure and bank performance. In the first paper, they find that bank efficiency
improved greatly after the relaxation of branching restrictions by states. Loan losses and operating
costs fell sharply, and the reduction in banks’ costs led to lower loan interest rates to bank
borrowers. Moreover, the relaxation of state limits on interstate banking also led to improvements
in bank performance. These gains were smaller, however, and any causal relationship proved less
robust. They suggest that much of the efficiency improvement brought about by banking and
branching deregulation reflected a selection process, whereby better performing banks expanded at
the expense of poorer performers. They also report that loan losses and operating costs fell sharply
with deregulation and that the reduction in banks’ costs led to lower loan interest rates to bank
borrowers. While improvements to the banking system helped bank customers directly, they also
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find important benefits to the rest of the economy. In particular, state economies grew significantly
faster after banking and branching deregulation occurred.
In the second paper, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) consider entry restriction, industry
evolution, and dynamic efficiency in commercial banking. They again show that bank performance
improves significantly after the lifting of restrictions on bank expansion. They find that operating
costs and loan losses decrease sharply after states permit statewide banking and branching and, to a
lesser extent, after states allow interstate banking and branching. They again argue that the
improvement following banking and branching deregulation occurs because better banks grow at
the expense of their less efficient rivals. By retarding the “natural” evolution of the industry,
banking and branching restrictions reduce the performance of the average banking asset. They also
find that banks pass on most of the reductions in banks’ costs to bank borrowers in the form of
lower loan rates.
Dick (2006) considers how nationwide banking and branching affected banking industry
market structure, service quality, operating costs, loan portfolio quality, service prices, and rates of
return. She differs from Jayaratne and Strahan (1997) in several ways. First, she focuses on the
latter stage of deregulation. Second, she analyzes not only the effects of deregulation on bank
performance measures but also the effect of deregulation on market structure and service quality.
Her results suggest that deregulation left the relevant geographic banking markets virtually intact,
with urban markets having two or three dominant banks in 1999 just as they did in 1993, with no
or little change in local concentration. Moreover, service quality improved, along with higher
operating costs and service fees. When service costs rise, she finds, customers experience more
value per dollar.

8

Our analysis directly extends a part of the analysis contained in Jayaratne and Strahan
(1998). In that paper, they consider the effects of intrastate and interstate deregulation of banking
and branching activity on bank performance. They examine six weighted average measures of
bank performance by state: return on assets, return on equity, the natural logarithm of non-interest
expenses, the ratios of non-performing loans, net charge-offs, and loan-loss provisions to total
loans. Their intrastate and interstate banking and branching dummy variables are defined as
follows. The intrastate dummy variable equals one for states that do not impose restrictions on
branching through merger and acquisition; zero otherwise. The interstate banking dummy variable
equals one for states with interstate banking agreements; zero otherwise. They employ panel data
estimation across various samples, the longest of which runs from 1975 to 1992.
Our analysis expands and improves on Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) by extending the
sample through 2004, which includes the passage of the IBBEA. As such, we can control for much
further movement toward interstate banking and branching activity than they could with their
sample ending in 1992. In addition, we also consider the effect of deregulation of geographic
restrictions on banking and branching activity across different asset-size classes, ranging from
small community banks through regional powers up to major international banks
Nippani and Green (2002) provide further background for our analysis. They examine the
effect of IBBEA on the performance of the banking industry by comparing pre- and post-IBBEA
performance measures. They adopt each of the performance measures of Jayaratne and Strahan
(1998), except the natural logarithm of non-interest expenses. Instead, they add net interest margin
to complete their set of six measures. They find that performance generally improved in the postIBBEA period. When they control for general economic conditions, however, the effect of IBBEA

9

on bank performance generally becomes insignificant. They conclude that macroeconomic control
variables affected bank performance more than the enactment of the IBBEA.
Several factors in the Nippani and Green (2002) method limit their analysis. First, they
only consider pre- and post-IBBEA performance. The IBBEA reflected the culmination of a
process of deregulation in the U.S. banking industry. Through their regulation of the ability of outof-state multibank holding companies to operate within their borders, states actually allowed
interstate banking in one form or another prior to IBBEA. For example, even though Jayaratne and
Strahan’s (1998) sample period pre-dates the passage of the IBBEA, they still used an interstate
banking indicator variable. Since Nippani and Green (2002) only consider the effects of IBBEA on
bank performance and ignore all the other regulatory changes that affected the geographic
operation of banks prior to the enactment of IBBEA, Nippani and Green (2002) misspecify their
model. We correct the misspecification in our paper by including more regulatory change variables
to capture the process of deregulation leading up to IBBEA. Furthermore, Nappini and Green’s
(2002) paper only considers national averages and excludes any information about differences in
bank performance across states, each of which faced different regulatory structure and change.
Once again, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) considered the possible effects of interstate banking and
branching activity on a state-by-state basis. We follow Jayaratne and Strahan’s approach. Since
different states enacted different branching laws as well as different regimes for in-state and outof-state bank holding company activities, analysis of the effects of regulatory change on bank
performance should occur at the state, not the national, level.
The enactment of Riegle-Neal IBBEA allowed banks to improve their efficiencies and
profitabilities through merger and acquisition across state borders. In a related paper, Nippani and
Washer (2005) show that large banks did improve efficiency and profitability after the enactment
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of IBBEA. They examine the effect of IBBEA on the performance of banks across different bank
asset size classes, albeit with national average performance measures. They find the return on
assets of small banks fell significantly below that of larger banks in the post-IBBEA period. This
result contrasts with the pre-IBBEA period when small banks successfully competed with and in
some cases outperformed larger banks. They conclude that the enactment of IBBEA placed small
banks at a competitive disadvantage, which could eventually lead to their demise – failure and/or
acquisition. We, too, investigate differential effects of IBBEA by size class of bank, but on a state,
not a national, level.
In sum, we employ a panel data across states to consider the effect of intrastate and
interstate deregulation of banking and branching activity on the performance of banks. We
combine the performance measures of Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) and Nippani and Green (2002)
to consider seven measures: return on assets, return on equity, the net interest margin, the ratio of
non-interest expense to total assets, and the rations of non-performing loans, net charge-offs, and
loan-loss provisions to total loans. And we also measure the effects on five distinct size classes off
banks as well as on the banking industry as a whole.
3.

Data and Methodology

We use data from three sources to examine bank profitability and performance before and after the
passage of IBBEA in 1994 We collect 1984 to 2004 end-of-year panel data on assets, operating
income, operating expense, equity capital, non interest income, non interest expense, loans, loans
90 days or more past due, nonaccrual loans, loan charge-offs, loan recoveries, and loan-loss
provision/reserves from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Report of Condition and Income

11

(Call Report) and merger data.4 We separate the merged data file into five different categories by
total asset size – banks with total assets less than $100 million, between $100 million and $300
million, between $300 million and $1 billion, between $1 billion and $15 billion, and over $15
billion, as well as all U.S. commercial banks combined -- and calculate totals by state and year. We
convert Bureau of Economic Analysis data on nominal personal income per capita by state into
real values, deflating with the consumer price index (CPI). 5 Finally, we collect data on the
unemployment rate by state from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.6 In our regression analyses of the
effects of deregulation on bank performance, the natural logarithms of each state’s unemployment
rate (lnunem) and real personal income per capita (lnrpipc) control for general economic
conditions while the natural logarithm of the average interest rate earned by banks by state, year,
and size class (lnaveint) controls for interest rate variation.7
We compute six weighted-average performance measures for each size class of banks by
state and year. These natural logarithm measures include i) the gross return on assets
[lnroa=ln(1+roa)]; ii) the gross return on equity [lnroe=ln(1+roe)]; iii) the net interest margin
[lnnim]; iv) the ratio of non-interest expenses to assets [lnnie/tl]; v) the ratio of non-performing
loans to total loans [lnnp/tl]; vi) the ratio of loan losses to total loans [lnls/tl=ln(1+ls/tl)]; and vii)

4

The data appear at http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/commercial_bank_data.cfm. We could
not use data over a longer period because information did not exist for total loans 90 days or more past due, total
nonaccrual loans, total non interest income, and total non interest expense in the Call Reports until 1984.
5

Nominal income data appear at http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm#state; CPI data come from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED source, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Since available data are monthly
observations, we compute annual values as monthly averages.
6

The data appear at http://stats.bls.gov/sae/home.htm. Once agin, annual unemployment rates equal monthly averages.

7

That is, in each state, year, and asset class size, we computed the average interest rate. Thus, this variable adjusts
across state, year, and asset class size.
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the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans [lnllr/tl=ln(1+llr/tl]. Our interest rate control variable
[lnaveint] equals the ratio of interest income to bank assets.8
We construct three dummy variables to capture the process of interstate deregulation of
banking and branching restrictions prior to the IBBEA. First, the dummy variable non equals one
after the adoption of full interstate banking and branching (i.e., IBBEA) and before IBBEA in
those states that allowed bank holding companies to enter their states from anywhere in the whole
country without requiring reciprocity. Second, the dummy variable nation equals one in those
states that allowed bank holding companies from anywhere in the nation to operate within their
states, but only with reciprocity. Third, the dummy variable reg-non takes a value of one before
IBBEA in those states that allowed out-of-state bank holding companies from a proscribed region
to operate within its boundaries -- either with or without reciprocity. The nation and reg-non
dummy variables equal zero after the adoption of IBBEA. Finally, the variable lnbch-bn measures
the natural logarithm of the number of branches per bank in a state. This variable captures the
degree of intrastate regulation of branching activity within the state.
To see how much of the variation in performance variables (lnroa, lnroe, lnnim, lnnie/tl,
lnnp/tl, lnls/tl, lnllr/tl) reflect changes in the independent variables of non, reg-non, nation, lnbchbn, lnrpipc, lnaveint, and lnunem, we estimate the fixed- and random-effects panel regressions of
the following form, where lnperf stands for each of the performance variables::
ln pref = α + β 1 roa ln bch -bn + β 2 roa non + β 3 roa reg -non + β 4 roa nation
+ β 5 roa ln rpipc + β 6 roa ln ave int + β 7 roa ln unem + ε roa .

The intercept term in each regression is modified when any of the dummy variables –non,
nation, or reg-non – equal one. For example, β 2 adds to the intercept when the dummy variable

8

We will provide details of our calculations on request.
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non takes a value of 1. Similarly, β3 and β 4 add to the intercept term when reg-non and nation
take a value of 1. Finally, β1 , β 5 , β 6 , and β 7 measure the marginal effects of changes in lnbcn-bn,
lnrpipc, lnaveint, and lnunem on the dependent variable.
4.

Preliminary Tests and Discussion

Nippani and Green (2002) report preliminary tests for differences between the bank performance
measures per- and post-IBBEA. They divide their samples as follows: 1990:1 to 1995:4 for preIBBEA and 1995:4 to 2000:1 for post-IBBEA. We provide similar evidence using our state-bystate information for the following samples: 1984 to 1995 for pre-IBBEA and 1996 to 2004 for
post-IBBEA. Thus, our samples begin earlier and end later than those in Nappani and Green.
Additionally, while Nippani and Green use information only at the national level, we use state-bystate information. This exercise allows the careful comparison of the general characteristics of our
database with their database.
Table 2 reports the findings. Our performance measures both pre- and post-IBBEA
generally possess similar magnitudes to those in Nippani and Green (2002, Table 1, 904-905),
where they do not consider the ratio of non-interest expenses to assets. The notable exception
occurs for loan loss reserves to total loans, where our means fall much lower. For example,
considering Panel F for all banks, we find ratios of 1.10 and 0.78 for pre- and post-IBBEA,
whereas Nippani and Green report 2.51 and 1.85. In other words, the inclusion of data for 1984 to
1989 and 2000 to 2004 leads to much lower values for loan loss reserves to total loans. We also
note that across asset size classes and different performance measures, the differences and
significance between the pre- and post-IBBEA periods in our Table 2 generally match those
reported in Nippani and Green.
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Panel F in Table 2 reports the findings for all banks. Here, we see that the return on assets,
return on equity, and the net interest margin all significantly increase in the post-IBBEA period.
Further, nonperforming loans to total loans, net loan losses to total loans, and loan loss reserves to
total loans significantly decrease in the post-IBBEA period. Finally, the non-interest expense ratio
does not alter significantly between the two periods. In sum, all bank performance measures,
except the non-interest expense ratio, improve in the post-IBBEA period. Nippani and Green (2002)
differ only in that for all banks, they report a significant decrease in the net interest margin.
We report similar patterns for the changes in the performance measures across the different
asset size classes as those for all banks. For banks with assets between $1 and $15 billion, the
findings match those for all banks exactly. For banks with assets between $100 and $300 million
and between $300 million and $1 billion, the findings prove identical to those for all banks with
one exception – although the net interest margin does increase in both cases, the increases are not
statistically significant. For the smallest banks (i.e., assets below $100 million), the net interest
margin proves significantly smaller in the post-IBBEA period, while the non-interest expense ratio
proves significantly larger. Moreover, no significant differences exist for the return on assets or the
return on equity pre- and post-IBBEA. For the largest banks (i.e., over $15 billion), no significant
differences exist for net loan losses to total loans and loan loss reserves to total loans, while the
non-interest expense ratio significantly increases in the post-IBBEA period.
Another way to view the information in Table 2 considers the best performances across the
seven performance measures across asset size classes in the pre- and post-IBBEA periods. For the
pre-IBBEA period, banks between $100 and $300 million in assets achieved the highest return on
assets and the lowest nonperforming loans to total loans, net loan losses to total loans, and loan
loss reserves to total loans. Banks between $1 and $15 billion in assets recorded the highest return
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on equity, whereas banks with assets below $100 million earned the highest net interest margin.
Banks over $15 billion in assets achieved the lowest non-interest expense ratio. Thus, banks
between $100 and $300 million in assets scored best on four of the seven performance measures.
The story alters somewhat in the post-IBBEA period. Now, banks between $100 and $300
million in assets earned the highest net interest margin, experienced the lowest net loan losses to
total loans and held the lowest loan loss reserves to total loans. Banks over $15 million in assets
earned the highest return on assets and highest return on equity. Finally, banks between $300
million and $1 billion in assets recorded the lowest non-interest expense and nonperforming loan
ratios. Once again, banks between $100 and $300 million in assets scored best, but now only on
three of the seven performance measures.
We also observe a consistent pattern that across asset size classes, bank performance
generally improved between the pre- and post-IBBEA periods. Return on assets and return on
equity rose while the non-performing loan, loan loss and loan loss reserve ratios fell. Two different
conjectures may explain this observation. First, the severe financial problems faced by the banking
industry during the early 1990s, when bank failures reached levels not seen since the Great
Depression, may have blunted average performance across asset size classes, which reversed itself
during the more financial friendly period in the post-IBBEA period. Second, as Stiroh and Strahan
(2003) argue, increased competition in the banking industry as a result of the banking deregulation
may have spurred a dynamic evolution that shifted bank resources to better performing banks. In
addition, the increase in the number of troubled banks during the early 1990s and the reallocation
of their resources may have aided and abetted this dynamic evolution.9

9

To the extent that resource reallocation to better performing banks also led to better banks increasing their size, then
these banks in one asset class size in the pre-IBBEA period may move to a higher asset class size in the post-IBBEA
period.
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In addition, Table 2 shows that the non-interest expense ratio did not alter significantly for
banks between $100 million and $15 billion in assets. This ratio rose significantly, however, for
the smallest and largest banks. Also, in the post-IBBEA period, the return on assets and the return
on equity monotonically increase from the smallest to the largest banks. That is, the rich got
relatively richer. The largest banks experienced the largest bump in profitability in the postIBBEA period and now lead all asset size classes in return on asserts and return on equity.
5.

Regression Results and Interpretations

In this section, we test whether the process of deregulation of banking and branching activity
within and between states improves bank performance. We estimate random- and fixed-effect
specifications for bank performance, including regulatory change variables as well as control
variables for the condition of the state economy. In order to choose between the fixed- and
random-effect specifications, we run Hausman specification tests. In all cases, we reject the null
hypothesis of the random-effect specification. Thus, we only report fixed-effect results, which
appear in Table 3. Several consistent findings deserve mention. We discuss, in turn, the effects of
regulatory variables and then the effects of economic control variables.
Effects of Regulatory Variables
First, the number of branches per bank (lnbch-bn) generally exerts significant positive effects on
the return on assets (lnroa), the return on equity (lnroe), and the net interest margin (lnnim) and
significant negative effects on the non-performing loan ratio (lnnp/tl), the net loan loss ratio
(lnls/tl), and the loan-loss reserve ratio (lnllr/tl) across all sizes of banks. That is, increases in the
number of branches per bank increase the banks’ profitability and performance and lessens the
importance of problem loans. Two conjectures may explain these findings. Banks with large
branching networks may exert more market power, improving bank performance and net interest
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margin; and banks with more branches may be better able to diversify their portfolios and reduce
average risk.
The effect of the number of branches per bank paints a different picture for the non-interest
expense ratio. Here, a negative effect occurs for all asset size classes, except for banks over $15
billion in assets, where a significant positive effect emerges. In addition, the negative effects prove
insignificant except for the smallest banks (under $100 million). That is, expanding the branching
network significantly reduces the non-interest expense ratio for the smallest banks, but
significantly increases this ratio for the largest banks. We conjecture that the relaxation of
regulations limiting intrastate banking led to more competition for the smallest banks, forcing them
to economize relatively on non-interest expenses. The largest banks, on the other hand, must
shoulder relatively higher non-interest expenses to maintain and expand their market shares.
Alternatively, we can conjecture that the largest banks faced less competition and did not control
their costs as carefully.
Second, only the net-interest-margin (lnnim) models exhibit significant coefficients for all
deregulation dummy variables across all bank size classes. That is, more deregulation of banking
and branching activity uniformly leads to a higher net interest margin. Here, too, we can conjecture
that reducing geographic regulatory restrictions may enhance the market power of banks,
facilitating an increase in net interest margins.
Finally, focusing on the interstate banking dummy variables, either regional or national
(reg-non, nation, and non), we find that banks between $300 million and $15 billion in assets
(panels C and D) experience many more significant effects of interstate banking deregulation than
small banks under $300 million in assets (panels A and B) and large banks over $15 billion in
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assets (panel E). F-tests for the joint significance of the interstate banking dummy variables10 show
that these dummies prove jointly significant in all seven equations for banks between $1 and $15
billion in assets, but only in five equations for banks between $300 million and $1 billion in assets
(joint insignificance in the return on assets and return on equity equations) and banks over $15
billion in assets (joint insignificance in the return on equity and loan-loss reserve equations). Banks
under $300 million experience the weakest response to interstate banking adjustments, where the
interstate banking dummy variables prove jointly significant in four equations for banks between
$100 and $300 million in assets (joint significance in the net interest margin, non-interest expense,
loan loss, and loan loss reserve equations) and in two equations for banks under $100 million in
assets (joint significance in the net interest margin and non-interest expense equations).
Across all asset size classes, interstate banking deregulation significantly increases the noninterest expense ratio with one significant effect for the smallest banks, two significant effects for
banks between $100 million and $1 billion in assets, and three significant effects for banks over $1
billion in assets. In other words, the emergence of interstate banking and branching activities
caused banks to spend relatively more money on non-interest expenses, where the effect becomes
more pervasive for the larger banks.
For banks between $300 million and $15 billion in assets, geographic deregulation
increases the riskiness of these banks (i.e., higher values for lnnp/tl, lnls/tl, and lnllr/tl), increases
their net interest margins, and sometimes lowers their returns on equity. What do these results
imply? We conjecture that many of these banks exerted local market power as large regional banks.
As these regional players took advantage of interstate banking, they acquired more risk but offset
this risk to some extent with higher equity to asset ratios and net interest margins. That is, if their

10

The joint significance levels are indicated by asterisks next to the dependent variables in column one of Table 3.
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returns on assets did not change and their returns on equity declined, then the equity to asset ratio
must have risen. Finally, their increased net interest margins may trace to enhanced market power.
The interstate banking dummy variables (reg-non, nation, and non) generally do not affect
return on assets. As the exception, they do significantly and positively affect return on assets for
banks with assets in excess of $15 billion. We also note in this connection that the interstate
banking dummy variables produce a negative effect on return on equity for the very largest banks,
although the complete set of interstate banking dummy variables proves insignificant in this regard.
These two results occur only if the equity to asset ratio falls with interstate banking activity for the
largest banks, just the opposite of the effect of geographic deregulation on banks in the $300
million to $15 billion asset size class.
Effects of Economic Variables
First, the average interest rate (lnaveint) generates significant positive effects on the net interest
margin, the non-interest expense ratio, the non-performing loans ratio, the net loan loss ratio, and
the loan loss reserves ratio across all bank sizes. What conclusion can we draw from these findings?
We conjecture that lending rates respond more vigorously than deposit rates to interest rate
increases, leading to a higher net interest margin as the average interest rate rises. Moreover, a
higher average interest rate may lead to self-selection of borrowers, implying a riskier pool of
borrowers, on average (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). As a result, banks expend more resources on
underwriting activity, because of the higher average risk level.
Second, higher real personal income per capita (lnrpipc) generally produces significantly
higher net interest margin, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loan ratio, net loan loss ratio,
and loan loss reserve ratio across all bank sizes. We conjecture that higher real percapita personal
income encourages banks to take on more risk, reflected by a higher net interest margin, non-
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interest expense ratio, non-performing loan ratio, net loan loss ratio, and loan loss reserves ratio.
But, small banks (under $1 million in assets) expaned their equity, reducing return on equity. The
largest banks (over $15 billion in assets) also managed to increase their return on assets, while not
altering their return on equity, implying that equity rose. Finally, a higher state unemployment rate
(lnunem) consistently worsens bank performance. That is, return on assets and return on equity
significantly decrease with a higher unemployment rate (except for return on assets for smaller
banks in panel A and for return on equity for larger banks in panel E) while the non-performing
loans ratio, the net loan losses ratio, and the loan losses ratio significantly increase with a higher
unemployment rate across all bank sizes.
6.

Conclusions

The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted branching
activity across states. Prior to IBBEA, many states enacted legislation to allow out-of-state bank
holding companies from a proscribed region to operate within their boundaries, either with or
without reciprocity from the home state of that bank holding company. Using state-level data, we
investigate the effect on average bank performance of deregulation toward complete interstate
banking and branching activity across states using the Report on Condition and Income (Call
Report) posted on the website of Federal Reserve of Chicago.
We reach some general conclusions. First, the process of deregulation on an intrastate and
interstate basis generally improves bank profitability and performance. The deregulation variables
significantly increased net interest margins across all bank sizes, as well as return on assets and
return on equity for large banks.
Second, we find that the macroeconomic variables -- the unemployment rate and real
personal income per capita – and the average interest rate significantly affected bank performance
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as much, if not more, frequently than the process of deregulation. Within the set of bank
deregulation variables, interstate branching regulation affected bank performance in each and
every equation reported, except for the non-interest expense ratio for banks between $100 million
and $15 billion in assets. The effects of interstate banking proved most important for banks
between $1 and $15 billion in assets and least important for banks under $100 million in assets. In
other words, intrastate banking deregulation affects banks of all sizes, but interstate banking
deregulation affects larger banks more than smaller banks.
Finally, some economists argued that deregulation toward full interstate banking and
branching activity would produce more efficient banks and a healthier banking system. That is, the
consolidation of the banking system allows banks to take advantage of economies of scale and
scope. Moreover, increasing bank loan portfolio diversification can reduce risk and lower the
probability of credit crises. Our results provide mixed evidence on this notion. To wit, more
deregulation of banking and branching activity leads to a lower non-performing loan ratio for
banks in excess of $15 billion in assets, but a higher net loan loss and loan loss reserve ratios
largely for banks between $300 million and $15 billion in assets.
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Table 1:

Years
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
Note:

Number of Banks by Year, 1976 to 2007
Number of
Banks
15,265
15,295
15,419
15,418
15,850
15,957
16,063
15,003
14,750
14,665
14,146
13,659
14,281
13,888
13,519
13,095

Years
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Number of
Banks
12,690
12,239
11,699
11,154
10,804
10,269
9,842
9,575
9,262
8,999
8,751
8,610
8,433
8,303
8,154
8,210

The number of banks data comes from the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago website Call Report data 1976-2007
(annually data) 1976-2006 (annually data)
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Table 2:

Tests of Difference in Means: 1984-1995 and 1996-2004

Variable Name
Pre-IBBEA Mean
Post-IBBEA Mean
Panel A: Banks with Assets less than $100 million
0.75
0.88
roa
7.69
7.53
roe
4.29
3.92
nim
3.73
4.33
nie/tl
2.18
1.07
np/tl
0.77
0.38
ls/tl
0.94
0.55
llr/tl
Panel B: Banks with Assets between $100 Million and $300 Million
0.91
1.23
roa
10.39
11.96
roe
4.12
4.14
nim
3.58
3.57
nie/tl
1.95
0.91
np/tl
0.67
0.37
ls/tl
0.85
0.53
llr/tl
Panel C: Banks with Assets between $300 Million and $1 Billion
0.80
1.31
roa
9.43
13.32
roe
3.99
4.01
nim
3.55
3.51
nie/tl
2.02
0.85
np/tl
0.86
0.50
ls/tl
1.02
0.62
llr/tl
Panel D: Banks with Assets between $1 Billion and $15 Billion
0.87
1.39
roa
11.62
14.69
roe
3.74
3.88
nim
3.63
3.64
nie/tl
2.14
0.91
np/tl
0.96
0.84
ls/tl
1.15
0.88
llr/tl
Panel E: Banks with Assets over $15 Billion
0.72
1.47
roa
9.98
16.46
roe
2.99
3.65
nim
3.19
3.79
nie/tl
2.62
1.08
np/tl
0.88
0.93
ls/tl
0.95
1.06
llr/tl

t-test
1.69
-0.29
-4.79***
2.85***
-14.31***
-6.16***
-5.66***
9.52***
4.86***
0.39
-0.13
-16.08***
-7.79***
-6.49***
9.53***
5.30***
0.31
-0.39
-13.80***
-4.96***
-4.94***
10.71***
4.95***
2.35**
0.06
-15.87***
-1.59
-3.54***
8.85***
4.31***
4.51***
3.19***
-7.75***
0.47
0.72
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Table 2:

Tests of Difference in Means: 1984-1995 and 1996-2004 (continued)

Variable Name
Pre-IBBEA Mean
Post-IBBEA Mean
t-test
Panel F: All U.S. Banks
0.84
1.32
12.74***
roa
10.62
13.20
6.14***
roe
3.85
3.96
2.14**
nim
3.48
3.52
0.65
nie/tl
2.25
0.92
-19.05***
np/tl
0.93
0.70
-3.49***
ls/tl
1.10
0.78
-4.91***
llr/tl
Note: The variables include the return on assets (roa), the return on equity (roe), the net
interest margin (nim), non-interest expense to total assets (nie), non-performing loans
to total loans (np/tl), net loan losses to total loans (ls/tl), and loan loss reserves to
total loans (llr/tl). We calculate all variables at the state level. The number of
observations in the pre- and post-IBBEA periods for the various samples equal the
following: Banks with less than $100 million in assets, npre = 612 and npost = 455;
Banks with assets between $100 and $300 million, npre = 611 and npost = 449; Banks
with assets between $300 million and $1 billion, npre = 599 and npost = 450; Banks
with assets between $1 and $15 billion, npre = 574 and npost = 437; and Banks with
assets over $15 billion, npre = 119 and npost = 208; and All banks, npre = 612 and npost
= 459.
***
significant at the 1-percent level.
**
significant at the 5-percent level.
*
significant at the 10-percent level.
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Table 3:

Fixed-Effect Models

Dependent Variable Independent Variable Coefficients
Intercept
lnbch-bn
reg-non

nation

non

lnrpipc

lnaveint

lnunem

Panel A: Banks with Assets less than $100 million
0.0901**
0.0045***
0.0012
lnroa
-0.2489
0.0423***
0.0014
lnroe*
0.2335
0.0777***
0.0614***
lnnim
-0.0073
-0.0845***
0.0260
lnnie/tl**
-2.7760**
-0.2027***
-0.0525
lnnp/tl
0.2156*** -0.0037***
0.0004
lnls/tl
0.2664*** -0.0046***
-0.0002
lnllr/tl

0.0007
-0.0068
0.1099***
0.0265
0.0010
0.0002
-0.0008

0.0008
-0.0173*
0.0811***
0.1049***
0.0136
0.0021*
0.0011

0.0098
-0.1091**
0.4289***
0.6521***
0.0603
0.0404***
0.0505***

0.0170***
0.0495***
0.7450***
0.1920***
1.0213***
0.0209***
0.0224***

-0.0032
-0.0453***
0.0534***
0.0178
1.0267***
0.0119***
0.0118***

Panel B: Banks with Assets between $100 Million and $300 Million
0.0103
0.0036***
-0.0004
-0.0006
lnroa
-0.5263*** 0.0342***
-0.0014
-0.0106
lnroe
-1.0068*** 0.0414***
0.0542*** 0.0892***
lnnim*
0.8026
-00228
0.0404*
0.0735***
lnnie/tl**
6.3174*** -0.3077***
0.0543
0.0878
lnnp/tl
0.1656*** -0.0043***
0.0008
0.0018***
lnls/tl*
0.2136*** -0.0048***
0.0004
0.0015*
lnllr/tl***

-0.0006
-0.0143*
0.0382***
0.0270
0.0483
0.0020***
0.0017**

-0.0009
-0.1510***
0.3343***
0.8494***
1.9490***
0.0316***
0.0398***

0.0013
-0.0188
0.3413***
0.3464***
1.6173***
0.0144***
0.0187***

-0.0037***
-0.0635***
-0.0123
0.1755***
1.2641***
0.0098***
0.0100***

Panel C: Banks with Assets between $300 Million and $1 Billion
0.0356
0.0036***
-0.0015
-0.0005
lnroa
-0.4697
0.0479***
-0.0233*
-0.0127
lnroe
0.7131
0.0896***
0.0527*** 0.0914***
lnnim*
-2.2272***
-0.0131
0.0688***
0.0467
lnnie/tl**
4.5487*** -0.2804***
0.1672*** 0.1439**
lnnp/tl*
0.2228*** -0.0046***
0.0035*** 0.0033***
lnls/tl*
0.2960*** -0.0055***
0.0023*
0.0023*
lnllr/tl***

-0.0003
-0.0182
0.0489**
0.1038***
0.0167
0.0058***
0.0040***

0.0054
-0.1405**
0.6613***
0.1026
1.6266***
0.0419***
0.0548***

0.0015
-0.0073
0.5988***
0.3849***
1.5214***
0.0227***
0.0279***

-0.0029**
-0.0641***
0.1103***
0.1275***
1.3188***
0.0143***
0.0138***

Panel D: Banks with Assets between $1 Billion and $15 Billion
0.0232
0.0031***
-0.0018**
lnroa**
-0.7737
0.1135***
-0.0612***
lnroe*
-1.2200*** 0.1610***
0.0730***
lnnim*
-2.6758***
-0.0217
0.1307***
lnnie/tl*
-0.7456
-0.1944***
0.1451**
lnnp/tl**
0.2667*** -0.0037***
0.0033***
lnls/tl*
0.2862*** -0.0049***
0.0034***
lnllr/tl**

0.0007
-0.0538**
0.1351***
0.2416***
0.1489**
0.0044***
0.0035***

-0.0003
-0.1156***
0.0741***
0.2053***
0.0349
0.0034**
0.0031**

0.0036
-0.1899
0.2896***
0.0321
0.4840
0.0528***
0.0541***

-0.0016
-0.0540
0.4959***
0.2854***
1.2167***
0.0203***
0.0235***

-0.0040***
-0.1083***
0.0527**
0.0423
1.1230***
0.0132***
0.0119***

Panel E: Banks with Assets over $15 Billion
0.0809**
0.0069***
lnroa**
-0.9043
0.3476***
lnroe
-0.9585
0.3674***
lnnim**
-2.2688
0.2922***
lnnie/tl*
9.4290*** -0.4367***
lnnp/tl*
0.3156***
-0.0031**
lnls/tl**
0.3163*** -0.0049***
lnllr/tl

0.0050**
-0.0356
0.1757***
0.3085***
-0.1322
0.0011
-0.0033

0.0046**
-0.1544*
0.1073
0.1585**
-0.5014***
-0.0004
-0.0024

0.0196**
-0.1226
0.5176*
0.2634
2.7130***
0.0670***
0.0668***

0.0051***
0.0273
0.6383***
0.4273***
0.9987***
0.0169***
0.0183***

0.0049**
-0.0478
0.2812***
0.1018
0.8520***
0.0136***
0.0134***

0.0033*
-0.0266
0.1202**
0.1564**
0.0152
0.0041**
0.0012
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Table 3:

Fixed-Effect Models (continued)

Dependent Variable Independent Variable Coefficients
Intercept
lnbch-bn
reg-non
Panel F: All U.S. Banks
0.0047
lnroa***
-0.7174***
lnroe**
-0.8013**
lnnim*
-2.0362***
lnnie/tl*
2.2342*
lnnp/tl*
0.2432***
lnls/tl*
0.2916***
lnllr/tl***

Note:

***
**
*

0.0030***
0.0485***
0.0613***
-0.0378***
-0.3038***
-0.0040***
-0.0044***

-0.0008
-0.0148*
0.0481***
0.0815***
0.1224**
0.0025***
0.0020**

nation
0.0009
-0.0089
0.1043***
0.1665***
0.1191**
0.0031***
0.0020**

non

lnrpipc

lnaveint

lnunem

0.0001
-0.0003 -0.0025** -0.0044**
-0.0307*** -0.1831*** -0.0440*** -0.0757***
0.0648*** 0.3959*** 0.3913*** 0.0382***
0.1564***
0.2152** 0.2316*** 0.0663***
0.0222
1.0722*** 1.3397*** 1.1555***
0.0037*** 0.0477*** 0.0202*** 0.0139***
0.0027*** 0.0548*** 0.0256*** 0.0128***

The variables include the natural logarithms of one plus the return on assets (lnroa), one plus the return on
equity (lnroe), the net interest margin (lnnim), non-performing loans to total loans (lnnp/tl), one plus net loan
losses (lnls/tl), and one plus loan loss reserves to total loans (lnllr/tl). The significance level of the F-test for
the joint significance of reg-non, nation, and non appears immediately after the dependent variables in
column one. We calculate all variables at the state level. The independent variables in the regression include
the reg-non, nation, and non dummy variables that takes a value of 1 for the post- reg-non, nation, and non
periods and 0 for the pre- reg-non, nation, and non periods and control variables for lnbch-bn (the natural
logarithm of the number of branches per bank), lnrpipc (the natural logarithm of real personal income per
capita), lnaveint (the natural logarithm of interest income to assets) and lnunem (the natural logarithm of the
unemployment rate). We calculate all independent variables at the state level.
significant at the 1-percent level.
significant at the 5-percent level.
significant at the 10-percent level.
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